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1. 
Introduction
Months after the arrival of the Covid-19 pandemic, huge numbers of UK 
health and care workers still lack adequate personal protective equipment 
(PPE). This is affecting many professions: doctors, nurses, hospital support 
staff, administrators, mental health workers in the community and primary 
care, and social care workers in a variety of roles. Nursing Notes reports that 
Covid-19 has killed 209 health and care workers in the UK as of the 14th of 
May 2020, and as Alex Bailin QC – an expert in corporate manslaughter law 
– says, many of these deaths were “avoidable with proper PPE”. This failure 
to protect health and care workers is a disaster in its own right, and it is 
contributing to Covid-19’s catastrophic death toll in this country.
The aim of this report is to expose the role that the privatisation of health 
and social care has played in this preventable catastrophe. Privatisation has 
created a system which is both chaotic and bureaucratic – both fragmented 
and sclerotic. There has been an outcry over PPE shortages in media 
coverage of the pandemic, but little has been said about privatisation. This 
is a serious oversight, which this report will address.
NHS Supply Chain – the organisation at the centre of this problem – was 
created in 2018, after years of outsourcing of NHS Logistics. NHS Supply 
Chain is technically a part of the NHS, headed by the Secretary of State. But 
this status is merely a fig-leaf for a needlessly complex web of contracts 
with private companies who answer to shareholders first. Immediately upon 
its formation NHS Supply Chain outsourced two major contracts for IT and 
logistics, and then broke up and outsourced the whole procurement system, 
by delegating eleven supply areas to various contractors. The parcel-
delivery company DHL was put in charge of finding wholesalers to supply 
ward based consumables, including PPE kits. Unipart was given control over 
supply chain logistics, including the delivery of PPE. The stated rationale for 
this approach – an almost obsessive drive towards greater outsourcing and 
greater fragmentation – was “efficiency savings”. 
In what follows we examine this heavily privatised, convoluted, and 
fundamentally dysfunctional system that NHS Supply Chain has created 
– one which puts layers of corporate red tape between doctors and 
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nurses who need PPE in order to work safely, and the companies making 
these supplies. The government’s failure to react to Covid-19 shouldn’t 
be downplayed, nor should the inherent complications of procuring PPE 
during a pandemic. But in order to make sense of these factors we need 
to understand how NHS Supply Chain itself was supposed to work, why it 
hasn’t worked, and what must be done differently in future.
While the government has been outsourcing NHS procurement, it has been 
losing its handle on the reins of NHS governance. In the early stages of the 
pandemic, when businesses and communities across the UK were lining 
up to help provide PPE, many found no one in government willing to take 
their call. When the UK needed decisive leadership it instead had a disparate 
network of private companies acting independently and with ineffective 
oversight. No wonder, then, that the Health Secretary, Matt Hancock, has 
often stumbled when trying to explain PPE shortages. In the back of his 
mind he may have been asking “didn’t we hand that problem over to Unipart, 
or DHL, or one of the other companies we’re paying to manage this?” Of 
course if he was thinking such a thing, he could scarcely voice it. And that is 
precisely the point. The public rightly expects the government and the NHS 
to take responsibility for essential, life-saving tasks. Instead of accountable, 
coordinated leadership, we have had a chaotic mish-mash of independent 
private contractors, and this has severely undermined the national effort to 
protect NHS and care staff.
There are plenty of “bad apples” in this story – companies whose track 
record, philosophy, and priorities mean that they shouldn’t have been 
entrusted with the responsibilities they were given. But this isn’t just a story 
about bad apples. It is a story of a flawed system that has helped turn the 
pandemic into an utter disaster. This system offers few real advantages 
over in-house NHS provision, and it creates a range of risks. It undermines 
coordination and accountability. It is a system in which a “just in time” 
ethos – devised by logistics companies in order to win contracts and enrich 
shareholders – takes priority over public health.
The Independent SAGE group has called for reform to this system. “There 
must be reform of the process of procurement of goods and services to 
ensure responsive and timely supply for primary and secondary care, and 
community infection control.” This is especially important, they argue, “in 
anticipation of a second wave of infection.” Our report echoes this call, and 
strengthens the case for it. We call on the government to simplify the NHS 
Supply Chain and bring it back into NHS control, as well as increasing overall 
NHS capacity, particularly locally, to deal with the virus. As soon as possible, 
the whole NHS should be reinstated as a fully public service and outsourced 
contracts across the board should be brought in house. That’s what NHS 
staff and health workers deserve after all they’ve done for us.
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2.
The Problem: Lack of PPE  
and Preparedness
A. Four Decades of Creeping Privatisation
Over the last 40 years the NHS has been subject to waves of policies that 
have given private companies opportunities to profit from the NHS budget. 
For example:
· In 1984 the Thatcher government instructed health authorities to 
open cleaning, catering, and laundry services to tenders from private 
contractors, resulting in tens of thousands of workers losing their jobs 
or being transferred to contractors on worse pay and conditions.
· In the 1990s the Major government split the integrated health 
authorities into “purchasers” and “providers” operating in an internal 
market with simulated competition.
· From 2000 the Blair government drove the contracting out of clinical 
care to private hospitals, “Independent Sector Treatment Centres” and 
private companies, facilitating the outsourcing of more work.
· In 2012 the Cameron government abolished Primary Care Trusts and 
Strategic Health Authorities, and replaced them with 207 Clinical 
Commissioning Groups, which were required to put a growing range 
of clinical services out to competitive tender, resulting in an increased 
share of NHS spending flowing to private providers. Procurement 
services were identified as a matter for centralised policy in 2005 
with the creation of the NHS Business Services Agency, which in 
2006 outsourced NHS Logistics, and its responsibility for logistics and 
procurement to DHL and Novation under a contract that lasted (after 
renewals and a reorganisation with additional outsourcing to private 
companies in 2015) until 2019. The Carter Review of NHS efficiency in 
2016 suggested that savings of about £700 million per annum were 
possible, through measures including (a) a faster shift to electronic 
procurement, (b) the formation of collaborative groups to share data 
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and experiences, (c) the creation of “collaborative procurement hubs”, 
and (d) “sharing or even outsourcing of their procurement back-office”. 
It also called for NHS Supply Chain to create a product price index 
which trusts could use to get an idea of what they should be paying for 
supplies, and for trusts to report monthly what they were buying, and 
for this “to develop into a national analytics and reporting system so 
that trusts have full visibility of what they buy, how much they buy and 
what they pay, and how this compares with their peers”.
While the Carter Review recommended sweeping changes, it did not 
recommend that the government should aim to centralise 80% of 
procurement for the whole of the NHS, nor that this procurement should be 
segmented and outsourced. This agenda emerged from the government’s 
own separate initiative, the Procurement Transformation Programme. This 
programme sought to replace the Business Services Agency and the DHL 
contract with a new system known as the Future Operating Model (FOM), 
aimed at centralising and dividing up the procurement process. The FOM 
was published in 2017, alongside claims that it would deliver £2.4 billion in 
savings over seven years up to 2022, and annual savings of £615 million 
thereafter. Until recently only 40% of NHS equipment was bought through 
the central system, but the government’s plan aims to get the centralised 
share of NHS purchases up to 80% by 2022.
The rapid privatisation of NHS procurement services in recent years is the 
end game of a decades-long, transformation in how the NHS operates. 
The general strategy behind that transformation has been to reduce 
expenditures by outsourcing services to providers that promise greater 
efficiency. The corresponding costs and downsides of this transformation 
have consistently been downplayed. 
B. Continuous Failure on PPE
As recently as the middle of March NHS officials were expressing confidence 
in the adequacy of the UK’s PPE supplies. On the 17th of March NHS 
representatives told the Commons Health Select Committee that there 
was adequate supply of PPE to “keep staff safe in the months ahead”. They 
acknowledged “local distribution problems” but insisted that two existing 
stockpiles – one for a pandemic, the other for a no deal Brexit – were 
sufficient. On the 20th of March deputy chief medical officer Jenny Harries 
claimed that the distribution issues were solved; on the 30th of March she 
said the UK always had sufficient stock.
By April the message was shifting. Harries apologised on the 1st of April, 
saying that the distribution element had proved “a little bit tricky”. The 
failure to provide adequate PPE to NHS hospitals was dubbed a “crisis within 
a crisis” in a joint trade union statement on the same day. By mid-April the 
urgent concerns of front line health workers were coming to light in the 
media. The death of Thomas Harvey – a nurse, 57, who died of Covid-19 
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on the 29th of March – drew attention to the issue after his son Thomas 
slammed the government’s failure to provide PPE: “why has it taken so 
long? Why have we had to lose my dad, and similar situations, for you [the 
government] to take action?” Mr Harvey had only been provided with gloves 
and “a flimsy apron” to protect himself while carrying out his work. The PPE 
shortage became more widely recognised after the death of another front 
line worker, Dr Peter Tun, who had reportedly pleaded with his hospital to 
provide his ward with PPE in the days before he contracted Covid-19. Dr 
Tun died at his own workplace, the Royal Berkshire Hospital, on the 13th of 
April. The Guardian reported that on the 23rd of March he had sent emails to 
hospital managers pleading for PPE, but was told that given short supply his 
neuro-rehabilitation ward ranked lower than others that needed protective 
kit. One manager emailed back to refuse his requests saying: “These 
supplies are not widely available and need to be used sensibly”. 
Since then the problem has become worse not better. On 17th April, several 
well-placed sources in procurement reported widespread concerns, 
more severe than so far in the Covid-19 outbreak. One source told HSJ 
the situation today was “not normal even during this pandemic”; another 
described the “critical” shortage as “a dire situation for everyone”. By early 
May two-thirds of all doctors in England said they still felt only partly or 
not at all protected, and half had resorted to buying their own PPE. One 
procurement lead told HSJ: “They aren’t supplying enough, they aren’t 
fulfilling orders. It’s completely chaotic.” Another said his trust had “just 
enough to manage for the time being.” Another said “We don’t know how 
much or when stuff is going to come in. The lack of recognition of the 
impact it’s having on clinician confidence, on patients, on staff safety — it’s 
irresponsible.” Two doctors have launched a legal challenge to guidance on 
PPE issued by NHS Supply Chain and others on the grounds that it fails to 
comply with international standards set by the WHO or UK law on health and 
safety.
The continuous failure to source enough PPE has led to companies 
exploiting the situation, with one NHS trust speaking to ITV News about 
“blatant profiteering” after a supplier offered personal protective equipment 
at 825% of the normal price. CEO of East Suffolk and North Essex NHS 
Foundation Trust (ESNEFT) Nick Hulme, told ITV News the firm – which he 
declined to name – offered to sell him coveralls for £16.50, which is £14.50 
more than the £2.00 they were in January before the coronavirus outbreak 
increased demand for PPE. Mr Hulme said the business he was talking 
about was not the only firm trying to “make a fast buck” adding that PPE 
price hikes during the coronavirus crisis were “happening a lot”. In the same 
week as the report, Chris Hopson, chief executive of NHS Providers, said 
that trusts are being forced into “hand-to-mouth” workarounds, including 
washing single-use gowns and restricting stocks to key areas.
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C. Rationing Demand Instead of Boosting Supply
These problems are not just due to a global surge in demand for PPE 
because of Covid-19. The UK, like all countries, has known for years about 
the need to stockpile equipment for use in epidemics, and to create secure 
supply chains for producing more. But the privatisation of NHS procurement 
generated perverse incentives that encouraged a rationing of the demand 
for PPE, rather than a boosting of supply.
On the 11th of February the UK Department of Health and Social Care 
(DHSC) sent a letter to NHS suppliers downplaying the risks of Covid-19. 
This was despite the WHO having already declared Covid-19 a “public 
health emergency of international concern”, while also warning of severe 
disruptions and shortages in PPE supply. The DHSC’s letter noted that the 
Chief Medical Officers had only raised the official risk to the UK from low 
to moderate, and it expressed confidence in the system’s resilience and 
preparation.
“The NHS and wider health system are extremely well prepared for 
these types of outbreaks and follow tried and tested procedures of the 
highest standards to protect staff, patients and the public.”
The DHSC’s letter thus instructed suppliers to keep their equipment 
stockpiles unchanged.1 The letter also asked suppliers to “monitor orders 
carefully and consider demand management plans in the event of excessive 
or unusual ordering patterns”. The DHSC’s message here, in effect, was that 
if there was an unusual surge in orders from NHS trusts, suppliers should 
plan on rationing supplies, rather than treating the shortage as a problem 
that the DHSC should be addressing itself. NHS Supply Chain started acting 
accordingly with PPE supplies shortly thereafter. In an “important customer 
notice” on the 21st of February, it warned NHS trusts and other customers 
that it would be “managing the demand for PPE products starting with FFP3 
Respirators to maintain continuity of supply across the network”. It said
“We have seen an increased demand for PPE products over the last 
two weeks as NHS trusts have put in place preparedness measures. As 
a result, we are implementing controls on excessive order quantities 
to ensure stocks are managed fairly for all of our customers… Orders 
placed for excessive order quantities may be subject to automatic 
system reduction. Any multiple orders placed by customers may be 
cancelled.”
1 The DHSC had actually built up stockpiles in 2019 in preparation for shortages resulting from Brexit. 
But after the election it was in the process of running them down again. The letter called for this 
“ramp-down” to be paused: “suppliers who still retain some or all of their EU exit stockpiles, should hold 
on to them, while the Department considers more targeted approaches… the Department has already 
directed NHS Supply Chain to pause ramp-down activity of the centralised stock-build of medical 
devices and clinical consumables.”
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Superficially this looks like a measure aimed at evenly distributing 
available PPE supplies to different NHS trusts. But what it means, in 
practice, is that companies holding the procurement contracts for 
various NHS supplies – e.g. DHL, for masks – were using automated 
processes to determine what counted as an “excessive” PPE request, 
and withholding supplies from NHS trusts accordingly. Instead of 
boosting supplies, NHS Supply Chain was rationing demand. By March, 
when the government started to realise that the UK had a critical 
shortage of PPE, it relaxed its official guidelines on the standards of 
protection required for workers in Covid-19 wards. As the Financial 
Times reported at the time, there was widespread suspicion that 
these guidelines were “tailored to fit the stockpile”. But this was 
the predictable result of the privatised procurement system that 
was already in place. Having outsourced responsibility for PPE 
procurement, the DHSC could delegate responsibility for managing 
PPE stockpile to obscure and anonymous private contractors. 
This might simply look like mismanagement. But active steps have been 
taken to prevent NHS trusts from finding their own solutions. Until recently 
NHS trusts could still directly buy their own PPE. Many of them formed 
“collaborative procurement partnerships” to make the process more 
efficient and gain from combined purchasing power. This enabled them to 
bypass the failings of the centralised NHS Supply Chain system by buying 
PPE materials directly, including from the many local sources offering it. 
But on the 3rd of May 2020 the government told trusts to stop buying their 
own PPE equipment and said that Supply Chain Coordination Ltd should 
take over the management of any new deals being negotiated between 
trusts and suppliers. NHS Supply Chain then issued suspension notices for 
13 non-invasive ventilator masks and 57 tracheostomy tubes, tracheostomy 
kits and vascular catheters, meaning they can no longer be ordered from 
its online catalogue as normal for hospital trusts. This move would “protect 
stockholding” and “push out volumes in line with the NHS England and NHS 
Improvement consumption model”. The details of this model are not known. 
The NHS Supply chain customer notice says “Orders which have been 
placed on 5 May 2020 will be cancelled.” We can only assume that these 
orders to ration equipment are advised by NHS Supply Chain’s Category 
Tower Service Providers (CTSPs), given that they are responsible for 
procuring these items. They are protecting their own contracts with other 
private companies, and literally managing demand to fit the supply, rather 
than responding to demands from the NHS for resources. 
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3.
The Structure of NHS Supply 
Chain: How Does it Work?
A. Fragmentation and Outsourcing of Procurement
The years 2017-19 saw a steady push – guided by elite management 
consultancy firms – towards the complete break-up and outsourcing of NHS 
procurement and logistics services. This began in January 2017 with the 
Department of Health advertising three year contracts for the procurement 
of £190m of NHS goods and services. In July 2017 Ernst & Young was 
awarded a lavish consultancy contract to help design the “intelligent client 
coordinator” for a new integrated procurement system. This system, in 
keeping with the recommendations of the Carter Review, was aimed at 
achieving annual savings in excess of £600m by doubling the proportion 
of products that the NHS buys centrally. In 2018 NHS Improvement (NHSI) 
frustrated the Health Care Supply Association – an association which 
promotes the work of procurement and supply chain staff in UK healthcare 
– by revealing they were again planning to hire management consultants, in 
this case to devise a new model for procurement of goods and services for 
local NHS trusts. The Association’s spokesperson argued that “the NHS has 
enough capacity and knowledge to be part of the solution, rather than have 
the solution done to us… the question in our minds is how is the centre going 
to effect change when they don’t control local teams?” But this criticism 
was ignored. One month later NHSI announced at the HCSA conference that 
the £400,000 contract had been awarded to Deloitte.
In February 2019 Unipart Logistics took over responsibility for delivering 
the logistics service for NHS Supply Chain as NHS Supply Chain: Logistics. 
NUHS Supply Chain’s press release boasted that “With the new provider now 
fully operational, all critical elements of the new operating model for NHS 
Supply Chain are now in place to support the delivery of safe, fit for purpose, 
value for money products to the NHS. This will enable our ambition to realise 
savings of £2.4 billion for the NHS in FY2022/23.” 
In April 2019 this transformation agenda took an important step forward 
when the administration of the NHS Supply Chain was taken over by Supply 
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Providers
NHS Supply Chain: Ward Based Consumables 
NHS Supply Chain: Sterile Intervention Equipment and Associated Consumables
NHS Supply Chain: Infection Control and Wound Care
NHS Supply Chain: Orthopaedics, Trauma and Spine, and Opthalmology
NHS Supply Chain: Cardio-vascular, Radiology, Endoscopy, Audiology and Pain Management
NHS Supply Chain: Large Diagnostic Capital Equipment including Mobile and Services
NHS Supply Chain: Diagnostic, Pathology and Therapy Technologies, and Services
NHS Supply Chain: Office Solutions
NHS Supply Chain: Food
NHS Supply Chain: Hotel Services
NHS Supply Chain: Logistics
NHS Supply Chain: Supporting Technology 
NHS Supply Chain: Rehabilitation, Disabled Services, Women’s Health and Associated
Consumables
DHL Life Sciences and 
Healthcare UK
Collaborative Procurement
Partnership LLP
DHL Life Sciences and 
Healthcare UK
Collaborative Procurement
Partnership LLP
Collaborative Procurement
Partnership LLP
Products and Services
DHL Life Sciences and 
Healthcare UK
Akeso & Company
Crown Commercial Service
Foodbuy
NHS North of England Commercial
Procurement Collaborative
Unipart Group Ltd
DXC Technology
HST
Supply Chain Coordination Limited (SCCL)
Management Function of NHS Supply Chain
NHS Supply 
Chain
Chain Coordination Ltd (SCCL), a company created by the Health Secretary, 
Matt Hancock, to be “the in-house management function of the NHS Supply 
Chain”. Although SCCL was said to be 100% owned and controlled by the 
UK government, its terms of reference made it clear that its purpose was to 
outsource almost every aspect of NHS procurement and logistics services. 
The SCCL was expected to do its job by overseeing and coordinating the 
procurement and delivery products, “ensuring the provision of reliable 
logistics services”, and “managing the provision of IT services”. Hancock 
appointed as CEO Jin Sahota, who had no experience of healthcare before 
he was appointed to DHSC Supply Chain in 2016, having worked for a series 
of private companies in the electronics and media sector, most recently as a 
senior vice-president of the French media multinational Technicolor. Sahota 
described SCCL as “equivalent to a FTSE250 business with approx. £3.2 
billion turnover”.
Unsurprisingly SCCL had no intention to oversee and coordinate NHS 
procurement services through the development of in-house resources 
and staffing capacity. Instead it divided responsibility for procurement 
into eleven different outsourced segments, known as “Category Towers” 
– each of which procures a different category of products, e.g. clinical 
consumables, capital medical equipment, or non-medical products such as 
food and office solutions – and each of which is intended to be managed 
by a different contractor, known as Category Tower Specialist Providers 
(CTSPs). The Category Tower structure is depicted in the following diagram.
Figure 1. Outsourcing procurement via the category towers
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B. Designating Approved Suppliers
CTSPs do not find supplies themselves. For products in their category, 
rather, they go through a process of choosing companies who will appear 
in the SCCL catalogue as approved suppliers. Trusts can then use the SCCL 
catalogue to order supplies from approved companies. Some products are 
classified under the National Contracted Products (NCP) initiative, which 
designates companies who will provide products with a standardised 
specification at an agreed price. These contracts are expected to deliver the 
savings.
For example, DHL’s CTSP contract for the “Infection Control and Wound 
Care” tower includes non-silicone foam dressings. A procurement exercise 
was carried out and awards made to just three suppliers: Smith & Nephew, 
Advanced Medical Solutions, and 3M United Kingdom PLC. At the same time 
twelve suppliers were removed from the approved list. The notice claimed 
that “there are potential national savings of £960,000 (20%)”. These savings 
are sought through two mechanisms. First, by limiting the ability of local 
NHS trusts and their staff to specify their needs in ordering supplies, the 
CTSPs simplify the requirements for suppliers, who only have to provide 
for a single specification. In other words: “product range standardisation is 
designed to remove unwarranted variation“. Second, companies are induced 
to offer these standardised products at a lower price through the creation of 
an oligopoly, i.e. a limited competition pool, in which the commercial market 
is only made open to a restricted group of vendors. Some of the suppliers 
who receive these approvals are wholesalers who don’t necessarily 
manufacture the products they supply. The PPE website listing shows a 
range of countries of origin for these products, e.g. the monopoly supplier of 
the standard surgical gown gets the products from an unnamed source in 
Egypt.
The product standardisation that the whole system aims to achieve has 
ironically proven to be one of the system’s shortcomings. As reported by the 
Telegraph on the 13th of May, “16 million protective goggles are being recalled 
from hospitals and the frontline after failing safety tests against Covid-19”. 
It continues
“a total stockpile of nearly 26 million “Tiger Eye” protectors failed to 
meet standards at their time of purchase under the Gordon Brown 
administration… The eye protectors were in CE marked boxes but do 
not meet the current requirement for splash protection ‘and should 
have been checked at the time of purchase’, the Government has 
acknowledged.“
Gowns from a shipment from Turkey were also dubbed “useless”. Mark 
Roscrow, the chairman of the Health Care Supplies Association, said the 
Turkey shipment had “clearly fallen short” and he asked why Government 
officials had failed to carry out proper checks before spending taxpayers’ 
money. “Something very wrong has happened here,” he told The Telegraph. 
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“It’s not clear to me why we weren’t able to obtain samples in the usual way, 
and to see that these gowns weren’t fit for purpose.”
C. Monopoly Suppliers of Gowns and Masks
One problem with this system is that SCCL and the various CTSPs do not 
have to designate a diverse pool of competing suppliers for each product. 
They can choose just one or a few companies and effectively award them 
a monopoly or oligopoly for the supply of a given product. The notional 
upside of this is that suppliers will offer a lower price if they are rewarded 
with a monopoly. But the predictable practical downside is that companies 
will offer low prices in order to be awarded a contract, and then later be 
unable to get sufficient quantity or quality to meet actual demand. The 
consequence of this is that supply will fail, or that the price may have to be 
increased after all, or worse, both.
This is in fact precisely what happened with two important elements of PPE, 
both of which resulted in monopolies being handed out to single suppliers. 
First, surgical face masks – Type IIR standard face masks – went through 
a mini tendering competition in 2018, as a result of which Mölnlycke Health 
Care Ltd was awarded as the sole, monopoly supplier of these masks from 
the end of October 2018. Eight other companies who had been supplying 
such masks were removed from the approved supplier list for at least 
twelve months, leaving NHS trusts working under the new system with no 
choice of supplier for surgical face masks. The notice claimed that “There 
are potential national savings of £622,331 (31.58%)”. It was also noted that 
trusts only used the centralised SCCL system for 39% of orders for this 
product, but the new deal would result in them using SCCL – and thus 
Mölnlycke – for 85% of the orders. One year later, in October 2019, NHS 
Supply Chain reported that the deal would be extended for six months to 
“allow for the CTSP time to reopen competition”, but meanwhile the deal 
would be extended for six months, even though Mölnlycke “has increased 
prices across the two product lines for the six month extension period.” This 
system has now broken down. The product listing in the new PPE channel 
includes 16 suppliers of IIR face masks, and on the 3rd of May Public Health 
England (PHE) published advice to consider lower quality alternatives. PHE 
said that this was “a pragmatic approach for times of severe shortage”.
There was a similar NCP process carried out in 2018 for single use Surgical 
Theatre Gowns. This was again awarded to a single supplier, IMS Euro Ltd 
– a Manchester-based wholesaler of medical consumables – at a price 
representing “significant savings opportunities of up to 33% (£1.5 million)” 
on the previous cost. IMS Euro was already an established supplier to the 
NHS, but this award meant that twelve other suppliers –including Medline, 
Guardian Surgical, and 3M – were removed from the online catalogue. What 
IMS had been awarded was effectively monopoly access to NHS trusts 
buying through the national listing. By the end of 2019, however, there were 
problems with quality, which had to be resolved by revising the specification 
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– and increasing the price, and extending the monopoly of IMS Euro until 
August 2020. NHS Supply Chain said at the time
“We have listened to customer feedback and worked with the supplier 
and Gowns Sourcing Group to develop a new improved specification… 
The improvements across the gowns mean that the cost price will 
increase by £0.25 pence per gown. However the improved specification 
gowns still represent a reduction in price from the other gown products 
of the same, or similar, specification within the market and still lower 
than the original gown product prices prior to the launch of NCP.”
But IMS Euro is only a wholesale distributor of goods, not a manufacturer, 
so it has to transmit – and regulate – this new specification to the 
manufacturers, who are thus multiple steps removed from the NHS 
hospitals and clinics who are relying on the equipment. The system for 
gowns has also clearly broken down. Caring for Covid-19 patients requires 
fluid-repellent gowns not covered by the monopoly for standard gowns. But 
the list of NCP products shows that the setting of a monopoly or oligopoly 
deal for these is now postponed indefinitely. The PPE channel reported on 
the 4th of May 2020 that
“stocks of fluid repellent gowns and coveralls remain pressured. This 
afternoon advice published on the Public Health England web page 
indicates other alternatives staff can use if a Trust runs out of suitable 
gowns or coveralls... For many weeks the Cabinet Office have been 
buying gowns and coveralls from existing manufacturers and working 
with numerous UK companies to get gowns manufactured at pace.”
One result of this failure was the now notorious contract for a plane-load 
of 400,000 gowns from Turkey that turned out to be a delivery of 67,000 – 
thousands of which were useless.
D.  A Complex Web of Contractors: Four Layers of Profit-
taking 
The result of this system is to create a complex web of companies 
distancing NHS trusts from suppliers of equipment, as shown in the tables 
and chart below. The actual manufacturers of gowns, masks, and other 
equipment are invisible and inaccessible to the NHS trusts who are ordering 
the products. Every piece of equipment passes through four levels of 
profit-taking before it arrives at the hospital. (1) The producers only deal 
with the wholesale suppliers, who (2) in turn receive their contracts for the 
different categories through CTSPs. (3) The CTSPs themselves are paid to 
find suppliers, and (4) the equipment is delivered by another company with 
a logistics contract. The horizontal division into multiple CTSP contracts 
makes this fragmentation even more complex, and adds the additional 
complication of outsourcing some of the system to foreign private 
companies. Currently, among the eleven CTSP contracts
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· Five of them have been awarded to UK public sector bodies
·  Two have been awarded to private UK-based firms – one to the large 
catering multinational Compass, one to the small consultancy Akeso 
· Four have been awarded to DHL – one of which is shared with a USA 
company – which is owned by the German post office, Deutsche Post, 
which is itself 20% owned by the German state  
These CTSP contracts in total cost £190 million. None of this money buys 
any actual medical equipment, rather, it pays corporate middlemen to find 
equipment suppliers. Paying the middleman is wasteful at the best of times, 
and all the more so when corporate middlemen in the NHS are proving 
spectacularly unreliable, e.g. in allowing millions of items of PPE equipment 
to be exported by British factories to Europe. There are also two other large 
central contracts issued by NHS Supply Chain, for: 
·  Logistics – awarded to the UK firm Unipart, for £730 million; and 
· IT technology – awarded to the American company DXC technology 
At the far end of the process are the actual producers of the medical 
supplies and equipment, many of which are to all intents and purposes 
anonymous and invisible actors in a globalised system of production. The 
143 products in the new PPE-dedicated supply channel – excluding those 
from the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Programme (PIPP) stockpile – 
are sourced:
61
40
23 19
4
2
1
from  
China 
from Mexico 
from Thailand 
from Egypt 
from the UK 
(mostly waste bags 
or cleaning fluids)
from 
Malaysia from France, 
Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands (and 
France/USA)
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CTSP 
Categories Contractors Parent country Value £M Years
Ward based consumables DHL Germany 22.5 3-5
Sterile Interventions Equipment 
Collaborative Procurement 
Partnership LLP
UK 18.0 3-5
Infection control and wound care DHL Germany 18.0 3-5
Orthopaedics, Trauma and Spine, 
and Ophthalmology
Collaborative Procurement 
Partnership LLP
UK 18.0 3-5
Rehabilitation Disabled Services, 
Women’s Health
Collaborative Procurement 
Partnership LLP
UK 18.0 3-5
Cardio-vascular, Radiology, 
Endoscopy, Audiology and Pain 
Management
HST = DHL + Vizient Germany + USA 18.0 3-5
Large Diagnostic Capital 
Equipment
DHL Germany 30.0 3-5
Diagnostic, Pathology and Therapy 
Technologies and Services
Akeso and company UK 22.5 3-5
Office solutions  Crown Commercial Services UK 3-5
Food Foodbuy (Compass Group) UK 12.5 3-5
Hotel services
Collaborative Procurement 
Partnership LLP
UK 12.5 3-5
PPE Monopoly Suppliers
Surgical gowns (standard) IMS Euro UK (sourced Egypt)
Surgical masks Mölnlycke
Sweden (sourced 
China)
Logistics and IT
Logistics Unipart UK £730 5
Logistics sub-contract Movianto USA
Supporting technology DXC Technology USA 4-6
Other Central Contracts
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness 
Programme (PIPP)
Movianto USA £55 5.5
Develop new procurement model Deloitte UK/global £0.4
Clipper Logistics UK n/a
Testing facilities management Deloitte UK/global n/a
Nightingale hospitals KPMG UK/global n/a
FIGURE 2. Contractors at various levels relevant to purchasing of PPE2
2 Sources various, including https://wwwmedia.supplychain.nhs.uk/media/DH-FOM-Phase-2-Announcement_FINAL-v3-1.
pdf; https://www.unipart.com/nhs-procurement-revolution-to-save-taxpayers-2-4bn/; https://www.contractsfinder.
service.gov.uk/Notice/Attachment/137423; https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk/Notice/Attachment/138764; 
https://wwwmedia.supplychain.nhs.uk/media/ICC_IT_Announcement.pdf.
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The table below shows the scale of the role of DHL, the company that was 
given contracts to manage 4 of the 11 CTSP categories of NHS procurement. 
In less than one year, between July 2019 and April 2020, DHL managed 64 
tenders for NHS supplies, deciding on the allocation of at least £4.1 billion 
of public expenditure on the NHS (values are only available for 47 of these 
contracts). DHL is accountable only to SCCL Ltd for the delivery of its 
contractual functions, not directly to the Secretary of State, nor to parliament.
  Date Value Status Awarded to
Blood Collection Systems and Blood Lancets Apr-20 168.00 award: Becton Dickinson
Needlefree Connection Systems and Associated Products Apr-20 144.00 award: 2 suppliers
Architectural Surgical Medical Systems, Operating and Diagnostic 
Imaging Tables, Patient Stretchers and Trolleys, Medical Lasers and…
Apr-20 90.80 award: 4 suppliers
Patient Assessment Devices Apr-20 14.10 award: 4 suppliers
Non-Invasive Ventilation, Sleep Therapy (CPAP) and Sleep Monitoring 
(Diagnostics)
Apr-20   update  
Syringes, Needles and Associated Products Apr-20   update  
Neonatal Equipment, Adult, Paediatric and Neonatal Phototherapy 
Devices and Associated Accessories
Mar-20 44.00 pin  
Blood Pressure Cuffs and Support Products Mar-20 13.00 pin  
Non-Invasive Ventilation, Sleep Therapy (CPAP) and Sleep Monitoring 
(Diagnostics)
Mar-20 216.00 tender  
Robotic Medical Equipment and Associated Accessories Mar-20 100.00 tender  
Subcutaneous Catheter Securement Device Mar-20 14.00 award:  
Healthcare 21Medical Consumables Products for the Pandemic 
Influenza Preparedness Programme (‘PIPP’) 
Mar-20   award  
Non-Invasive Ventilation, Sleep Therapy (CPAP) and Sleep Monitoring 
(Diagnostics)
Mar-20   update  
Syringes, Needles and Associated Products Mar-20   update  
Syringes, Needles and Associated Products Mar-20   update  
Fractional Flow Reserve – Computed Tomography (FFR-CT) Services Mar-20 27.60 award: Heartflow
Maintenance, Repair and Calibration of Medical Equipment Feb-20 394.00 pin  
Subcutaneous Catheter Securement Device Feb-20 14.00 pin  
Syringes, Needles and Associated Products Feb-20 240.00 tender  
Total Orthopaedic Solutions 2 Jan-20 2.00 award: 5 suppliers
4D Non-Invasive Representation of the Coronary Artery System 
Including Flow Data, Services
Jan-20 27.60 pin  
Reusable Waste Container Service Dec-19 20.00 pin  
Enteral Feeding, Bile Bags and Associated Products Dec-19 69.60 tender  
Respiratory and Suction Consumables Dec-19   update  
Enteral Feeding, Bile Bags and Associated Products Dec-19   update  
Respiratory and Suction Consumables Nov-19 167.00 tender  
General Wound Care Oct-19 360.00 pin  
Negative Pressure Wound Therapy Oct-19 72.80 pin  
Disposable Wipes for Surface Cleaning and Disinfection Oct-19 68.00 pin  
Diathermy Consumables and Related Accessories Oct-19 20.20 pin  
Medical Hollowware Oct-19 4.10 pin  
Patient Dry Wipes Oct-19 24.00 tender  
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Table: DHL tenders 64 NHS contracts worth at least £4.1billion in less than 1 year  
NHS Supply Chain Operated by DHL Supply Chain tenders July 2019-April 2020
Source: http://bidstats.uk/tenders/?q=DHL
  Date Value Status Awarded to
Airway Management Products and Associated Equipment Oct-19 172.00 award: 5 suppliers
Pulse Oximetry, Capnography and Related Patient Monitoring 
Technologies
Oct-19 85.40 award: Albert Waeschle
Electrodes, Ultrasound Gels, Defibrillation and Related Consumables Oct-19 58.00 award: 4 suppliers
Wound Drainage and Autologous Blood Systems Oct-19 32.00 award: 3 suppliers
Sharps Pads and Associated Products Oct-19 1.40 award: 3 suppliers
Patient Dry Wipes Oct-19   update  
Single Use Tourniquet Oct-19   update  
Advanced Wound Care Sep-19 248.00 pin  
Electrosurgical Equipment, Smoke Evacuators, Related Products and 
Accessories
Sep-19 30.00 pin  
Pressure Infusers Sep-19 3.40 pin  
Single Use Tourniquet Sep-19   pin  
Patient Monitoring Equipment, Related Accessories and Services Sep-19 165.00 tender  
Architectural Surgical Medical Systems, Operating and Diagnostic 
Imaging Tables, Patient Stretchers and Trolleys, Medical Lasers and…
Sep-19 90.80 tender  
Patient Assessment Devices Sep-19 14.10 tender  
Blood Collection Systems and Blood Lancets Sep-19   update  
Medical Consumables for the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness 
Programme (PIPP)
Sep-19 4.70 tender  
Decontamination Capital Equipment and Associated Accessories Aug-19 45.00 pin  
Blood Collection Systems and Blood Lancets Aug-19 170.00 tender  
Needlefree Connection Systems and Associated Products Aug-19 144.00 tender  
Medical Chart Paper and Ultrasound Film
Aug-19 5.90 award:
Nissha Medical 
Technologies
Non Invasive Ventilation, Sleep Therapy and Sleep Monitoring Jul-19 180.00 pin  
Operating Microscopes and Associated Accessories Jul-19 50.00 pin  
Imaging, Radiotherapy and Ancillary Devices and Associated 
Accessories
Jul-19   pin  
Oxygen Therapy Products for the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness 
Programme (‘PIPP’)
Jul-19 0.13 tender  
Enteral Feeding, Bile Bags and Associated Products Jul-19   award  
Needlefree Connection Systems and Associated Products Jul-19   award  
Medical Consumables for the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness 
Programme (PIPP)
Jul-19   update  
Medical Consumables Products for the Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness Programme (‘PIPP’)
Jul-19   update  
Respiratory and Suction Consumables Jun-19 180.00 pin  
Needlefree Connection Systems and Associated Products Jun-19 130.00 tender  
Medical Consumables for the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness 
Programme (PIPP)
Jun-19 10.30 tender  
Medical Consumables Products for the Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness Programme (‘PIPP’)
Jun-19 7.10 tender  
TOTAL 4142.03
19 Privatised and Unprepared: The NHS Supply Chain
IT
DXE
Infection 
control …
DHL
Orthopaedics  
…
NHS Collab
Rehabilitation 
Services …
NHS Collab
Cardio-
vascular …
DHL + Vizient
Large 
Diagnostics …
DHL
Diagnostic 
services …
Akeso
Office  
solutions
Crown 
Commercial
Food
Foodbuy
Hotel  
services
NHS Collab
Ward-based 
consumables
Surgical  
masks
Molnlycke
Unknown 
manufacturer 
(China)
DHL
Sterile …
equipment
Surgical  
gowns
IMS Euro
Unknown 
manufacturer 
(Egypt)
NHS Collab
£
£
£
£
£
£
£ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £
£
NHS trusts  
and hospitals
PPE channel
Clipper
£
Local firms, 
universities, 
businesses,  
groups
The multi-layered privatisation of NHS supplies
The supplier contracts are listed at www.supplychain.nhs.uk/categories/ward-based/
Logistics
£
Unipart
PIPP 
stockpile
Movianto
£
Department  
of Health
SCCL Ltd
FIGURE 3. Multiple and multi-level system of procurement
E.  Further Privatisation Failures: Stockpiles and 
Emergency Initiatives
Other elements of the NHS procurement system could have and should 
have contributed to addressing the UK’s PPE shortage during the unfolding 
Covid-19 crisis. First, the UK government has a longstanding commitment to 
stockpile supplies in case of an epidemic. Second, it established a separate 
PPE supply channel and an emergency cabinet taskforce in March 2020 to 
try to help address PPE shortages. On both fronts the decision was made, 
again, to outsource key services. The results were predictably dire.
i. Pandemic Stockpiling
The NHS should have had stocks of PPE ready to be deployed in a 
pandemic situation like the one that has unfolded. Its pandemic influenza 
preparedness programme (PIPP) included a commitment to holding a 
stockpile of millions of pieces of equipment, mostly PPE, for such an event. 
Responsibility for this was outsourced in 2018 under a £55 million contract 
which included the construction of a brand new custom-built warehouse. 
The contract was issued to Movianto, a subsidiary of USA health supplies 
firm Owens and Minor. But following a crash in its share price Owens and 
Minor announced in January 2020 that in order to reduce debt, they were 
selling off Movianto to a large French distribution company, EHDH.
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This PIPP stockpile should have been a key source of PPE. However, the 
Guardian reports that drivers  described the system at the warehouse as 
“chaos”, and  Channel 4 News has seen stock control reports which reveal 
(a) that the amount of equipment stockpiled in January 2020 was at times 
10 or even 28% lower than the levels recommended in 2009, (b) that there 
were no gowns included, and (c) that “45% of the 19,909 boxes holding PPE 
supplies had exceeded their use-by dates”, including masks and respirators. 
The PPE supply channel list of products shows six different models of masks 
or respirators in the PIPP stockpile, but two of these are described as having 
been “replaced” by other models on the list.
ii. Emergency Initiatives
Two emergency government initiatives have been undertaken since 
March to try to address the PPE shortage situation. Just last month the 
government created a new PPE supply channel which was supposed to 
accelerate delivery of PPE supplies both to NHS trusts and to care homes, 
community, and GPs. The contract for operating this new system was 
awarded to Clipper Logistics, a company whose CEO is a leading donor and 
supporter of the Conservative Party. This supply channel is failing to meet 
the needs of the care sector. A report of the Local Government Association 
(LGA) in May 2020 states that
“care providers and councils are still not able to access sufficient 
supplies of PPE… Care workers and other staff are not being provided 
with the protection they need to carry out their roles looking after 
vulnerable people. This is putting workers and vulnerable people at risk… 
The intended national “Clipper” system has been too slow to come on 
stream and providers are increasingly turning to alternative suppliers 
and facing inflated costs and lack of product assurance – giving rise to 
further risks.“
This report includes quotes from a number of frustrated council officials.
· “PPE is a huge issue – we were led to believe that PPE would arrive, and 
it didn’t, although we did get a shipment of 50 fluid resistant masks. We 
are now seeking to source our own PPE” (Chief Executive)
·  “We had a delivery of face masks that were not up to specification 
and had to be replaced. Seven boxes came damaged on last delivery” 
(County Council)
· “LRF drops of PPE have had expiry dates of 2015 at worst and 2018/19 
at best. We have decided that we will not use these” (Unitary Council)
This failure followed on from another failed government initiative, in which 
a crisis cell spearheaded by Deloitte was established in the Cabinet Office 
in late March, to try to deal with PPE procurement for NHS staff. Deloitte 
has strong links with the Cabinet Office: Minister Chloe Smith was a 
consultant at Deloitte before going into politics, and a senior policy advisor 
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also previously worked for the company. While it was tasked with procuring 
emergency supplies, it was Deloitte that failed to respond to the 8,000 
frustrated emails from would-be suppliers; and which allowed millions of 
items of PPE equipment to be exported by British factories to Europe and 
the US after companies failed to get any response.
This is an excerpt from the Telegraph on Deloitte’s failings: 
“Senior sources in the UK manufacturing industry, however, on Friday 
night described the project as a “disaster” and said manufacturers had 
struggled with communication and red tape.
Instead of identifying UK-based supply chains, sources said, the team 
at Deloitte pursued factories in China where prices have increased and 
supply is short due to spiralling global demand.
Part of the problem is that the NHS began sourcing disposable kit from 
Chinese factories some years ago in order to cut costs, so UK suppliers 
shut down production, sources said.
“It’s been a nightmare to deal with Deloitte,” one factory owner told the 
Telegraph.
“They don’t seem to understand how supply chains work and they 
spent too much time going after China.
“They talk about a global supply shortage and that’s true. So why have 
they barely spoken to factories across this country who know how to 
make this kit?
“It took ages to be given the specifications for exactly the gowns they 
wanted. Many UK companies have been completely ignored. And even 
when we do come up with solutions, we get snarled up in rules and 
regulations.”
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4. 
Why Outsourcing Has Failed
A. Loss of Accountability and Public Interest
The multi-layered outsourcing system described in the previous section 
has undermined the core function of a public service procurement process. 
Such a system should use the integrity of civil servants directly employed 
by government, in order to try to fulfil the following conditions and ideals 
· That the public interest remains paramount
· That procurement takes place via transparent procedures of 
competitive tendering, published criteria, and diligent investigation of 
company records, thus minimising, corruption, cronyism, and cartels
· That there is rigorous public scrutiny of contractor performance and 
payments of public money
·  That the specification and supply of equipment should be based on the 
requirements of public services
· That ministers are accountable for all of the above
The NHS’s increasingly privatised procurement system has almost none 
of these features. It is rife with cronyism, and desperately short on 
accountability and oversight. It has already proven unwilling or unable to 
resist the encroachment of predatory cartels. (A parliamentary debate in 
2019 concerned the Kier Group having awarded supplier status for floor-
coverings in NHS hospitals to three foreign firms – who had been convicted 
just a few months earlier in France of operating a price-fixing cartel for 23 
years.) Moreover, by devolving the responsibility for procurement itself, the 
public interest is not represented in the system in any kind of accountable 
way. “The Department of Health and Social Care, despite holding 
responsibility for the management of the supply chain of the NHS, is now 
rather detached from operational decisions”. In other words, the secretary 
of state quite literally doesn’t know how the NHS supply chain is being 
operated. 
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The advocates of privatisation and outsourcing predictably argue 
that expertise in procurement is about being aware of how to make 
the competitive market work in the interests of the purchaser. But in 
the privatisation of NHS procurement the ideal of market competition 
has routinely lapsed into monopolistic and oligopolistic arrangements. 
The needs of NHS staff – for better quality or quantity of goods – are 
subordinated to the contractual rigidities of the suppliers, whose interests 
are unjustifiably prioritised. And government and parliament are not 
unaware of the downsides of privatising procurement processes in public 
services. For example in 2013 the Conservative government abandoned 
proposals for privatising defence procurement. The decision was strongly 
influenced by a report from the Royal United Services Institute, which 
pointed out that there would not even be any savings. The US had already 
found that “placing more procurement functions with private sector results 
in higher rather than lower costs”.
B. Public Risks of a “Just in Time” Business Model
On its website Unipart claims that the automotive sector has lessons for 
healthcare logistics. It asks what car parts have to do with patients or 
screws, and batteries with bandages and medicine. The answer is that
“The automotive sector is built upon the foundations of The Toyota 
Production System – a way of working which ensures just in time 
production, quality to be built within the process, and stop points to 
avoid passing on defects.”
Just-in-time production is a system of supplier / customer relationships 
whose key purpose is to minimise waste, including excess inventory. This is 
the opposite of what is needed in NHS supply chains. The primary concern 
for public health systems should be ensuring that there is sufficient give 
and flexibility in the system, so that “inefficient” excess inventories of 
key supplies are available for unforeseen exceptional emergencies, like 
epidemics. When applied to health care, the “just in time” approach touted 
by companies like Unipart can turn into the nightmare of inadequate stocks 
just when they are most needed. 
The inflexibility of outsourced and centralised procurement is also being 
seen in the USA, where there is a huge petition from doctors for the states 
to bypass the market and directly requisition production capacity from 
companies to produce locally the PPE and other equipment they need.  
C. Outsourcing: No Gains in Efficiency or Expertise
Many measures to address the Covid-19 crisis have been outsourced to 
contractors who have failed to deliver. This work should have been done 
by civil servants or local government offices who answer to the public. 
But capacity is low because of austerity, and many politicians have an 
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ideological preference for outsourcing. This ideological preference is now 
costing lives. Dozens of studies across the world have found that the 
evidence does not support the lazy assumption that private companies are 
more efficient than public provision. In the UK especially there is no excuse 
for such mistaken beliefs, in the wake of a series of fiascos going back to 
the horrific plunge in NHS hospital hygiene standards after the privatisation 
of support services in the 1980s, up to more recent examples including 
the collapse of Carillion, the failure of privatised ambulance and patient 
transport services, and the incompetence of Compass, G4S, and Serco. 
Outsourcing work to private companies rarely brings expertise into the 
public service. Quite the opposite: contractors end up relying on the existing 
expertise of staff previously employed by the NHS, e.g. the 2000 NHS 
logistics workers who were transferred to Unipart – along with the use of 
NHS assets, including warehouses, vans, and lorries – when Unipart was 
awarded a major NHS logistics contract (see section 7B, below). Consider 
also the key NHS staff who were transferred to the small management 
consultancy Akeso, now in charge of procuring diagnostic and pathology 
equipment for the whole of the NHS (see section 7A, below). The lack of 
private sector expertise is often glaringly obvious, as when Deloitte were 
given the contract for organising Covid-19 testing sites across the country, 
despite not having carried out such work in the past. And this general 
problem – an expertise deficit in private companies awarded private NHS 
contracts – can be observed not only in relation to supply of PPE but other 
important measures to respond to Covid-19.
· The development of a new website to improve the supply of PPE to GPs 
and care homes was outsourced. The site was expected to launch in the 
week of the 6th of April, but as of the 15th of May 2020, the PPE website 
was still telling them that “a solution to meet this demand is in the final 
stages of development. Until you receive further information, please 
continue to order through your regular ordering channels”.
· Contracts to operate drive-through coronavirus testing centres were 
awarded under special pandemic rules through a fast-track process 
without open competition. The contracts, the value of which has 
not been disclosed, were granted to accountants Deloitte, which 
is managing logistics at a national level. Deloitte then appointed 
outsourcing specialists Serco, Mitie, G4S and Sodexo, and the pharmacy 
chain Boots, to manage the centres. These arrangements have failed, 
with the testing centres being reported as “too far away” by some, the 
wrong tests being sent out, results being lost and others being sent to 
the wrong person. Other expensive contracts have been issued to the 
big accountancy/consultancy firms to do work for which they have no 
qualifications, with the cost of the contracts remaining secret. 
· When schools were closed as part of the lockdown, a scheme was set 
up to ensure that 1.3 million children in England who are eligible for 
free school meals would instead receive vouchers worth £15 a week. 
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The scheme was outsourced to Edenred, a French company whose 
main business involves promoting luncheon voucher schemes in many 
countries. But the system does not work: school staff have often had 
to stay up late into the night to access the online system, while many 
parents cannot download the vouchers: “one school, in Worcestershire, 
unable to access vouchers for their vulnerable families for the past 
fortnight, turned to a charity to provide food parcels.”  Edenred has 
merely said it is “We are aware that some schools have faced long wait 
times when using the site.”
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5. 
The Solution: An NHS Supply 
Chain that Works for Us All
In light of the manifest failures and problems that have resulted from the 
privatisation of NHS procurement and supply chains, and the disastrous 
results of this in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, we call on the 
government to bring the NHS Supply Chain back into public ownership.
The procurement of goods for the NHS should itself be a function of the 
NHS, not an additional profit stream for private contractors who contribute 
no expertise and who have not delivered an efficient or effective system. 
Procurement should be brought back in-house, with a direct line of 
accountability through the Department of Health and Social Care, the 
Secretary of State and Parliament. We need
· A procurement system which is clear, transparent and properly 
coordinated, where we know who is in charge of decision making
· Accountability, including public servants we can turn to for answers, 
not a haphazard array of private companies who are accountable 
primarily to their shareholders.
· The right priorities; public safety and the health of the nation must be 
the NHS’s top priorities, not savings, cost-cutting, and private profits.
The NHS Supply Chain itself will need to rely on three sectors to procure the 
goods and equipment it needs – the public sector, private businesses, and 
local community initiatives. And a sensible balance can be struck between 
centralisation, aimed at increasing efficiency, and localisation, aimed at 
enabling NHS trusts to be able to make the most of local manufacturing 
activity and opportunities.
A. The Public Sector
As well as bringing the supply chain function itself back into the NHS, the 
government should create a state owned supplier of medical goods and 
equipment. It makes sense for countries to try to predict future pandemics 
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and take steps to be prepared. We know that our government ignored the 
results of its Exercise Cygnus which predicted in 2016 that we would be 
ill-prepared for a pandemic, and allowed stockpiles to go out of date. In the 
future it should take steps to increase its own resilience. 
One of these steps should include setting up an in-house manufacturer for 
basic medical goods and equipment for the NHS, one that is able to turn 
its hand to whatever is needed at short notice and reduce some of the risk 
involved in being dependent on global supply chains. The fewer the links in 
the chain, the greater the capacity for local and national level production, 
the more our immunity from global pandemics in the future.
This supplier could take on a key role in stockpiling supplies, while also 
acting as a “run-of-the mill as a supplier of run-of-the-mill healthcare 
consumables and equipment (dressings, drips, disposable gowns, beds, 
surgical scrubs and equipment, etc.), and competing with other suppliers in 
the domestic and international market”.
This would actually be building on existing government policy for public 
sector manufacture and distribution of vaccines, as there is a public 
sector solution available for vaccine production, namely, VMIC. A Covid-19 
vaccine has yet to be developed, but when it is, the next great task is to 
manufacture and distribute the product on a mass scale. This is one area 
where the government has made a far-sighted decision. In 2018 it invested 
£66 million in creating a new public sector company Vaccine Manufacturing 
and Innovation Centre UK Ltd (VMIC), owned by three major public 
universities: University of Oxford, Imperial College London, and the London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. The centre has also linked up with 
private sector partners with extensive experience in vaccine manufacturing 
and development, including Janssen Vaccines & Prevention B.V. and 
Merck Sharp and Dohme (MSD), who will share expertise and also invest 
an additional £10 million. The reasons for setting up VMIC in 2018 are even 
more compelling today.
“Major epidemics and pandemics are not a thing of the past… The UK 
needs the capacity and the speed of response to provide vaccines at 
the required scale quickly in an outbreak… The scale of manufacture 
must be large relative to the costs of set-up. VMIC will satisfy this with 
higher product yields, shorter cycle times and lower costs. The facility 
aims to manufacture millions of doses in the response time needed… An 
effective national response must bring vaccines to emergency workers 
and the general public in the shortest possible time. In an outbreak 
threat the Global Health Security Programme team at the Department 
of Health will immediately step in to work with the VMIC management 
team to ensure that the national priorities are met… this Centre will 
make better vaccines, more quickly, to help save thousands of lives 
across the world and protect just as many here in the UK.”
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The original plan was to complete the construction of the new plant by 
2022, but the construction of the facility has already started, and it is being 
accelerated.
“Construction work has begun ahead of schedule to build the highly 
specialist facility that will house… the country’s first bespoke strategic 
vaccine development and manufacturing capability. A rapidly 
accelerated programme will aim to see the 7,000m2 (footprint) state-
of-the-art facility opening its doors in 2021, ahead of the original 
scheduled date in 2022. An unprecedented collaborative effort between 
The Vaccines Manufacturing and Innovation Centre, Harwell Campus, 
Vale of the White Horse District Council, UK Research and Innovation, 
and Glencar, the main contractor, has accelerated the construction of 
this complex build in order to bring the facility on line early so that it can 
provide an emergency response capability for the UK.”
At the same time VMIC is working closely with teams developing the 
vaccines:
“Dr Matthew Duchars, Chief Executive of VMIC said: “Whilst no-one 
could have predicted the Covid-19 outbreak we are doing all we can to 
fast track the build so VMIC is set-up to offer long-term support to the 
UK’s future vaccines needs whilst simultaneously contributing right 
now to the vital work that will help us emerge from this pandemic… 
VMIC scientists and engineers are working round the clock as part of 
the BIA Covid-19 Taskforce, and alongside Oxford University advising 
on manufacturing options of the vaccine candidate ChAdOx1 nCoV-19, 
which has recently opened for trial.”
B. The Private Sector 
The NHS has always had to buy in huge quantities of goods it cannot 
manufacture for itself, ranging from toilet paper to drugs, prosthetics and 
complex equipment, from the private sector. These suppliers will need to 
deliver a profit in order to stay in business.
During this crisis, businesses and communities have come forward, eager 
to help provide the vital PPE our NHS needs. The government has had more 
than 8,000 offers of supplies, and Labour’s Rachel Reeves says dozens of 
companies offering PPE have been ignored. There have been significant 
offers of help from unions and workers to create a PPE manufacturing 
army, had it been understood what gaps there were in supplies, and had the 
supply chain been able to respond to such needs. As a statement from Unite 
explains:
“The country’s leading manufacturing union Unite, doctors’ union, the 
British Medical Association, Unison and the Royal College of Nursing 
have today (Friday 3 April) joined together in calling on the government 
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to unleash a national effort to produce the protective equipment 
millions of key workers desperately need to keep safe during the health 
crisis… manufacturing capacity currently furloughed or underutilised 
should be repurposed amongst the UK’s world leading manufacturers 
to produce the PPE kit desperately needed by our NHS, social care 
providers and other front-line workers across UK industry.”
The insourcing of NHS Supply Chain contracts should create accountability 
and coordination so that businesses can contribute to their full potential. 
There are however some very positive developments in response to the 
crisis, which show that it is possible to provide the needs of the NHS by 
local sourcing of materials, whether from the private sector, voluntary 
organisations, or direct production.
C. A Surge of Local Initiatives 
There has been an outburst of rapid and innovative responses from local 
people, groups, shops, businesses and universities wanting to help produce 
and deliver the equipment necessary. The NHS system is currently unable 
to respond to these initiatives widely, however several solutions have been 
devised. Supplies for local hospitals and trusts have been sourced using 
simple direct arrangements. 
· Engineers at Nottingham mobilised the 3-D printing machines to 
produce masks at scale for health workers. Aerospace engineers in 
Burnley led a similar project.
·  Staff at the Sir John Cass School of Art, Architecture and Design at 
London Metropolitan University have sewn nearly 500 face masks over 
the past week for Whittington Hospital and Hammersmith Hospital. The 
team made the masks following closely the guidelines laid out by the 
NHS, and will continue sewing the vital safety accessories for other 
London maternity hospitals. 
· Cheltenham Hackspace is a community workspace that provides space 
and tools for their members to work on their hobbies and interests. They 
have chosen to use some of their tools – including 3D printers and laser 
cutters – and tech expertise to produce PPE for frontline workers and 
have already made over 2,000 much needed PPE face shields.
· Helping Dress Medics, has already delivered 8,000 scrubs to newly 
qualified medics and other staff who may not have access to scrubs 
and have struggled to obtain them through the usual suppliers.
· Alisa Pearlstone from London, who sold her healthcare public relations 
company in 2016, launched NHS Hero Support with her husband a 
month ago and has already raised more than £88,000. Ms Pearlstone 
and a team of 30 volunteers have established an international logistics 
network to buy kit from countries such as China and Hungary. Her 
group has sourced more than 180,000 pieces of kit and distributes it 
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through a network of 1,000 volunteer drivers, supplying hospitals from 
Aberdeen to Brighton. “We’re not trying to be the NHS, we’re just trying 
to make sure people aren’t going into work with their arms bare, their 
faces bare,” she added.
· The British retailer John Lewis is reopening its Herbert Parkinson 
textiles factory in Lancashire, which usually manufactures curtains, 
pillows and duvets, to produce 8,000 clinical gowns for the NHS.
· One GP says her practice is using personal protective equipment (PPE) 
made by local firms, as well as schools and residents after government 
supplies stopped in March. The donations included 50 visors made by 
schools. Other schools have stepped in too, like this one in Somerset.
Again these initiatives have come in other areas too
• UCL engineers re-designed and developed a new less invasive 
breathing aid suitable for use with Covid-19 patients, and much 
less invasive than a full ventilator in less than a week. They lined 
up Mercedes UK to manufacture it, and also released the entire 
specification for free global use. 
A publicly owned NHS Supply Chain could continue sourcing supplies from 
businesses and community initiatives as needed, working in partnership 
with the local trusts, as well as relying on the state owned manufacturer. 
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6. 
Conclusion
Privatisation left us unprepared for a pandemic. If it were not for 
coronavirus, the huge problems with outsourcing NHS Supply Chain might 
not have been brought to public attention in such a stark way. Now that 
they have been brought to our attention we need to act, urgently.
The companies involved in the supply chain vary in terms of their track 
records and philosophies. Their cultures and approaches range from the 
fairly innocuous to the truly scandalous. But they are all part of a system 
which puts the profits of companies above the well-being of patients and 
the smooth functioning of our NHS – a system so convoluted that it’s 
almost impossible to trace the source of problems and hold decision makers 
accountable; a system that puts cost-cutting above the safety of the 
nation.
The chance to serve our NHS is a responsibility to be taken seriously and 
handled carefully, not an opportunity for maximising profit while dodging 
accountability. If we are to move forward, we need an NHS Supply Chain 
that puts people before profit, which takes responsibility instead of 
abdicating it, and which prioritises long-term planning and community 
safety.
To achieve this, we recommend:
· Privatisation and outsourcing of the NHS’s Supply Chain services must 
end. The entire system must be simplified and brought under direct NHS 
control, with clear lines of accountability and a culture of prioritising 
safety, long term planning and smart use of skills and resources within 
the NHS and in local communities and the local manufacturing sector.
· All NHS services, including logistics and procurement services, must be 
explicitly kept off the table in international trade agreements.
· A public inquiry should be held as soon as possible into the 
government’s handling of the PPE crisis, looking at the role of the NHS 
Supply Chain in the failings that have emerged and are still emerging.
· Capacity and expertise must be rebuilt at every level throughout the 
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NHS and the public sector, following the example of the new vaccine 
centre and other innovative public ownership models.
· To enable this, our NHS must be properly funded, to the level of 
comparable European countries, so that our funding per head is on 
a level with that of countries like France and Germany. Costly PFI 
contracts must be ended as soon as possible.
· Legislation must be passed to reinstate our NHS as a fully public 
service, with the Secretary of State for Health holding primary 
responsibility. There should be an end to the wasteful competitive 
market for NHS services and the restoration of pride and capacity in our 
national treasure.
Every part of our NHS is vital. There isn’t an optional extra section. There 
aren’t easy pickings which don’t matter. It all matters. Let’s not wait for the 
next pandemic or crisis to further rip our communities apart with grief. We 
must take action to expand the capacity of our health service so that it can 
protect us.
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7. 
Annexe: NHS Supply Chain 
Contractors 
Many of the problems discussed in the foregoing report are illustrated in the 
public records of the companies which have been given major contracts for 
managing key areas of procurement, the basic core functions of logistics 
and IT, and those which have received special contracts in the Covid-19 
crisis. They include companies responsible for major expensive failures 
on previous government contracts (DXC, Serco), engaged in repeated 
global failures of audit work (Deloitte), involved in recent disputes over 
underpayment of staff on NHS contracts (Compass), that are self-confessed 
former members of international cartels (DHL), with past investigations 
over bribery (Compass), and that are chaired by an active donor to the 
Conservative Party (Clipper Logistics). The point is not that the wrong 
companies have been chosen, but that using any contractor carries 
significant risks of failure or conflicts with the public interest.
A. Category Tower Service Providers
i. DHL
DHL was the key beneficiary in 2015 when the government initially 
outsourced the running of the entire NHS supply chain. The company 
still boasts in a case study about how it helped the government privatise 
“purchasing and supply agency and logistics authority”. The company 
is now owned by Deutsche Post, but it had a chequered history before 
then. In the 2000s DHL was a core member of freight cartels operated 
across Europe by leading firms, including DHL and UPS, meeting in an 
“unpretentious Italian restaurant on the outskirts of London”. France fined 
the companies €672m, and the European Commission also applied fines of 
€169 million to the cartel members – except DHL, who received immunity 
for becoming a whistle-blower. DHL also confessed to being part of a cartel 
in Singapore in 2014, thus again obtaining immunity.
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ii. Vizient
Vizient is a huge healthcare operations company in the USA servicing the 
private healthcare system. Part of that is supply chain work but some of it 
is more over-arching in terms of the organisation of a hospital. Vizient has 
already had some consultancy and operations contracts with the NHS.
iii. Akeso
Akeso is a small management consultancy in London which employed about 
30 people before getting a £9 million contract for procuring diagnostic, 
pathology, and therapy equipment and associated consumables – its 
biggest job ever. It is not so much bringing expertise to the NHS, but rather 
taking it out by taking on NHS staff. The contract has already produced 
a career move in the other direction where a former Akeso director, Sue 
Colbeck, has now become deputy at NHS London procurement partnership.
iv. Foodbuy (Compass Group)
Foodbuy is the wholesale supply division of the world’s largest catering 
multinational, Compass Group, which profits from many public service 
contracts for school meals, hospital catering, and university catering 
– unlike the government, Compass does not outsource its own supply 
chain. There have been hundreds of performance problems with Compass’ 
contracts. The most recent was in March 2020, when a head teacher in 
Bristol denounced as “shameful” the loaf of bread, crisps, and cooking 
butter supplied by the Compass Group company Chartwells for free school 
meals children during the shutdown. The firm’s response was to blame 
“difficulties faced in the food supply chain” – in other words, the role of 
Foodbuy. The Bristol Post reported under the headline “Catering firm 
slammed for charging £11 for free school meal consisting of crisps and 
slab of butter. It continues “Catering firm says poor provision is due to food 
supply chain issues caused by coronavirus”. There would be sympathy as far 
away as Shanghai, where in 2018 the food regulators investigated the food 
safety controls of a Compass company after it supplied mouldy food to a 
large school.
Compass has also been in major disputes over pay with staff working for 
them on NHS contracts. In 2019 hundreds of cleaners, caterers, porters, 
receptionists and security workers employed by Compass at NHS trusts 
in St Helens and Blackpool took repeated strike action over the company’s 
failure to match health service pay rates and working conditions. Compass 
paid only the minimum wage instead of the NHS rate, no overtime rates 
at weekends, and minimal sick pay. Compass’ record also includes being 
investigated for bribery by the UN in 2005, paying US $18 million in 
reparations for overcharging schools in New York in 2016, supplying burgers 
with horse meat to schools in Ireland in 2013; and facing complaints about 
the quality of the food being served at Dunedin Hospital.
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B. Logistics and IT Contracts
V. Unipart
Unipart was created in 1987 via a management buyout of the spare parts 
arm of British Leyland, led by John Neill, who is still CEO. Neill was on the 
board of Rolls-Royce in 2008-15 when it was involved in paying huge 
bribes for international contracts.3 Unipart is now majority owned by its 
employees and pension fund. The original car parts business was sold off 
in 2011 and collapsed in 2014 with the loss of 1,400 jobs. Unipart received 
a five-year NHS logistics contract in September 2018 – covering inventory 
management, warehousing, and delivery of medical consumables and 
devices – in a deal worth £730 million. 
Unipart doesn’t bring new expertise to the NHS, rather it has taken 
experienced staff out of the NHS. About 2000 former NHS staff were 
transferred to Unipart with the contract. Nor did it bring in assets from 
the private sector, it simply “took over the operation of “the warehouses, 
systems, vehicle fleet and all other assets”, which are still owned by the 
NHS, including a new warehouse due to open in May 2020. The NHS 
contract is crucial for Unipart’s profitability, representing about 20% of its 
entire annual turnover of £799 million. Unipart said in April 2020 that it 
expects to see “continued growth in sales and profitability in 2020” despite 
losing business off firms who closed because of the lockdown.
vi. DXC Technology – formerly CSC, EDS
DXC is a huge USA IT services company formed from a merger in April 2017 
between CSC and HPE (HPE was formerly known as EDS). It was awarded 
the contract for the entire IT system of NHS Supply Chain:
“DXC Technology has been awarded a “major” contract by the 
Department of Health and Social Care for the new NHS Supply Chain. 
DXC will assist with the transformation of the NHS’s procurement 
and logistics arm – namely the delivery of a new operating model 
– as outlined in the Department of Health and Social Care’s (DHSC) 
Procurement Transformation Programme. The revamped system is 
expected to be fully operational by April 2019 and aims to simplify 
the procurement landscape for NHS organisations, while ensuring 
they can “purchase quality goods and consumables for patient care 
at the best possible value,” DHSC said. NHS Supply Chain provides 
3 Nils Pratley wrote in the Guardian, in 2017: “For Rolls-Royce, the company, the book is now almost 
closed. It has apologised “unreservedly” in court for the bribery and corruption in its midst in the period 
1989 to 2013. It will pay £671 million in penalties… But two questions still loom large: who, at the top at 
Rolls-Royce, knew what was going on and when? … The leadership of Rolls-Royce knew in 2010 about 
allegations regarding corruption within the company but decided not to notify the Serious Fraud 
Office, according to the damning judgment on the scandal from Lord Justice Leveson. The verdict 
raises questions for the board of directors at the time about the extent of their knowledge of irregular 
activities and why no action was taken… The board in 2010 contained some heavyweight City figures… 
[including] John Neill. The brains behind car parts group Unipart for 40 years. Neill took over as a 
29-year-old and is today chairman and chief executive. On the board of Rolls from 2008 to 2015. He 
declined to comment.”
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procurement, logistics, e-commerce and customer and supplier support 
services to the NHS. Under the contract, DXC will be responsible for 
delivering supporting technologies and IT infrastructure services 
across NHS Supply Chain. This will include the management, support 
and maintenance of the internal IT systems infrastructure, hardware 
and software applications across the business, as well undertaking 
a “significant programme of IT modernisation and transformation” to 
support the future development of the service.” 
Yet both of the companies that merged to form DXC 3 years ago had 
appalling track records in terms of incompetence, including three of the most 
expensive disasters in the history of NHS and UK government computing, 
as well as similar failures on contracts in the USA, and being investigated for 
accounting fraud, and making false statements to investors.
CSC: 
• In June 2013, Margaret Hodge, chair of the Public Accounts Committee, 
described CSC as a “rotten company providing a hopeless system” 
with reference to their expensive failure on a multibillion-pound NHS 
contract for IT services:  “Under the original 2003 contract, CSC was 
supposed to have delivered the Lorenzo electronic patients’ records 
system by 2005 to 166 different NHS bodies, yet by 2011 it had only 
made it to 10”. The company was paid a total of £2.2billion. The 
government “didn’t have a strong negotiating position because of the 
contracts”, and even “handed CSC £2.9 million in legal fees since it 
started negotiations to kill the contract in 2010.” 
· CSC also failed badly on a contract for the USA government’s IRS: “CSC 
was one of three contractors hired by the Internal Revenue Service 
to modernize its tax-filing system. CSC told the IRS it would meet a 
January 2006 deadline, but failed to do so, leaving the IRS with no 
system capable of detecting fraud. In 2006, House Ways and Means 
Committee Chairman Bill Thomas called for the Treasury secretary 
to review the IRS contract, saying that because of CSC’s inability 
“to deliver a functional product to the government and its inability 
to provide accurate information to the IRS, it may be an appropriate 
time to re-examine the dependence of the IRS on CSC and determine 
whether the federal government is best served by this particular 
contractor”. CSC’s failure to meet the delivery deadline for developing 
an automated refund fraud detection system cost the IRS between US 
$200 million and $300 million.
• In May 2013 the company was forced to pay US $97.5 million as a result 
of a class-action lawsuit. Investors had sued the company claiming 
it made false statements about its performance on a US $5.4 billion 
electronic patient records contract with Britain’s National Health 
Service. CSC also has been under investigation by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission for accounting issues in that contract. 
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· In February 2011, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
launched a fraud investigation into CSC’s accounting practices in 
Denmark and Australian business. CSC’s CFO Mike Mancuso confirmed 
that the alleged misconduct includes US $19 million in both intentional 
accounting irregularities and unintentional accounting errors. 
· CSC was accused of breaching human rights by arranging several illegal 
rendition flights for the CIA between 2003 and 2006: “CSC organised 
rendition flights on behalf of the CIA to carry prisoners between a 
number of locations, including Guantánamo Bay and notorious ‘black 
sites’ in North Africa, South East Asia and Eastern Europe – where they 
were held incommunicado and tortured”.
EDS:
Electronic Data Systems (EDS) was founded in 1960 by Ross Perot, who 
also ran as an independent presidential candidate against GW Bush and 
Clinton in 1992 and got 19% of the vote. EDS had disastrous IT outsourcing 
contracts from the UK government in the 1990s and 2000s: 
· In December 2003, EDS lost a 10-year £3 billion contract to run Inland 
Revenue IT services after a series of serious delays in the payment of 
tax credits. EDS had operated systems for the Inland Revenue since 
1994 but the performance of its system had been low, causing late 
arrival of tax credit payments for hundreds of thousands of people. EDS 
performed so badly that the contract was not only terminated, but EDS 
paid compensation to the UK: “Under the previous contract, EDS agreed 
to pay £71.25 million to settle the Department’s claim for compensation 
for the Tax Credit computer problems. The settlement included cash 
payments by EDS and the offsetting of certain amounts which would 
otherwise have been due to HMRC.”   
·  In 2004, EDS was criticized by the UK’s National Audit Office for its 
work on IT systems for the UK’s Child Support Agency (CSA), which ran 
seriously over budget causing problems which led to the resignation of 
the CSA’s head, Doug Smith. The system’s rollout had been two years 
late and following its introduction in March 2003 the CSA was obliged to 
write off £1 billion in claims, while £750 million in child support payments 
from absent parents remained uncollected. An internal EDS memo was 
leaked that admitted that the CSA’s system was “badly designed, badly 
tested and badly implemented”. In 2004 UK MPs described it as an 
“appalling waste of public money” and called for it to be scrapped.
· In 2006, EDS’ Joint Personnel Administration (JPA) system for the 
RAF led to thousands of personnel not receiving correct pay due to 
“processing errors”. EDS and MoD staff were reported to have “no 
definitive explanations for the bodge”.  
· In September 2007 EDS paid US $500,000 to settle an action by the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission regarding charges related to 
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overstatement of its contract revenues in 2001–2003. At the time these 
caused a fall in share prices in 2002 which led to legal action against 
EDS from US shareholder groups.
• Securities and Exchange Commission regarding charges related to 
overstatement of its contract revenues in 2001–2003. At the time these 
caused a fall in share prices in 2002 which led to legal action against 
EDS from US shareholder groups.
On 2007-10-16, British TV company BSkyB claimed £709m compensation 
from EDS, claiming that EDS’ failure to meet its agreed service standards 
resulted not just from incompetence, but from fraud and deceit in the way it 
pitched for the contract.
During the BSkyB case, it was shown that a Managing Director had obtained 
a degree over the internet. Lawyers for Sky were able to demonstrate that 
the process for awarding the degree claimed would give a degree to a 
dog, and that the mark attained by the dog was higher than that of the HP 
executive, who was questioned on his expertise and integrity. HP [who then 
owned EDS] lost the case with a preliminary £200 million payment ordered, 
whilst they appealed over the £700 million total.
C. Other Major Contracts
vii. Movianto
Movianto is a subsidiary of the USA private healthcare logistics company 
Owens and Minor which is listed on the NY stock exchange and has an 
annual turnover of US$9.8 billion, with 6,400 employees in the USA and 
9,000 across the rest of the world.
Owens and Minor bought Movianto in 2012 from the German company 
Celesio AG.      
In January 2020 Owens and Minor announced that it is selling Movianto to a 
French healthcare logistics company EHDH.
In July 2018 Movianto won the £55 million contract for running the 
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Programme (PIPP), set up to ensure an 
adequate stockpile of essential supplies in case of an epidemic.   
viii. Clipper Logistics
Clipper Logistics has been sub-contracted by NHS Supply Chain logistics 
contractor Unipart to run an entirely separate supply channel for the 
provision of personal protective equipment (PPE) to NHS Trusts and 
community healthcare partners. On the 1st of April 2020 it was awarded 
a new contract by Unipart specifically to supply PPE. Yet reports suggest 
that “the government’s long-promised Amazon-style “Clipper” system 
to dispatch personal protective equipment is still not up and running 
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nationally”, with care homes not receiving the PPE they need nor the 
testing.
Clipper Logistics was founded by its current chairman Steve Parkin in 1992, 
and floated on the stock exchange in 2014. It gets a lot of business from the 
growth in online retailing. In November 2019 its share price leapt by 20% due 
to a planned takeover by a private equity firm Sun European Partners, which 
was backed by Parkin, but the bid was abandoned in January 2020.
Its share price then fell dramatically in March alongside the FTSE 100, but 
then recovered nearly all its losses when the new NHS contract emerged at 
the end of March 2020.
The company’s chair has strong personal and financial links with the 
Conservative party.
· The company’s chairman Steve Parkin is a major donor to the 
Conservative Party, a lifelong Tory and fan of Margaret Thatcher.   
· “Over the last half-decade, Clipper’s founder and chairman Steven 
Parkin has donated a total of £725,000 to the Conservative Party, 
including the most recent donation of £25,000 on 12 December 
2019 – when the General Election resulted in Boris Johnson returning 
as the UK’s Prime Minister. From 2018, Parkin began attending  
Conservative Party Leaders Group meals. The Leaders Group, as the 
Conservative Party website explains, is “the premier supporter Group 
of the Conservative Party. Members are invited to join the Leader and 
other senior figures from the Conservative Party at dinners, post-
PMQ lunches, drinks receptions, election result events and important 
campaign launches”.
· Just days before being given the contract to handle the logistics of 
supplying PPE, Clipper was repeatedly criticised by its own workers for 
its cavalier attitude towards measures to protect against Covid-19: 
– Clipper Logistics told employees at one of its Northampton depots 
that “it will not shut one of its Northampton sites, even if there is a 
confirmed case of COVID-19”, before being given the contract for PPE 
a few days later. The site handles Zara clothes. 
– Clipper was also under fire from its employees at the Ollerton depot 
for failing to shut down ‘non-essential’ activity such as handling 
clothes refunds and putting employees at risk with warehouse staff 
being “crammed into corridors” with no hand sanitiser available “for 
weeks”.  
– “Concerns have been raised by warehouse workers who allege they 
could face disciplinary action if they stay home over coronavirus 
fears. Workers at the Clipper Logistics site at Wynyard Park near 
Billingham have been reportedly told that any ‘unpaid leave’ will be 
treated by the firm as ‘unauthorised absence.’...The Northern Echo 
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understands that workers have become increasingly worried over 
staff working closely together and the prospect of being dismissed. A 
site worker, who wishes to remain anonymous, said: “There are people 
working on site who have a bad cough and have been coughing 
since last week but have remained at work.” Management know of 
these people showing the symptoms, but are doing nothing about it. 
“All they are telling their staff is ‘wash your hands’ and use the hand 
sanitizer. It takes more than just that. “It seems Clipper Logistics has 
chosen to put money and profits before the public health and their 
own employees’ health.”
ix. Deloitte
Deloitte Touche are one the world’s big 4 multinational accountancy/
consultancy groups, along with PWC, E&Y, and KPMG. Deloitte have obtained 
a series of major contracts from the NHS in relation to NHS procurement. 
The first was a £400k contract to design the new centralisation of the 
whole procurement system. This could have been done in-house, according 
to the Health Care Supply Association, and is discussed above in section 4C.
An NHS official involved in awarding the contract to Deloitte then got 
himself a ‘revolving doors’ job with Deloitte, for whom he had worked 
previously.
The basic function of accountancy firms is to audit the accounts of 
companies. These audits are used to reassure investors and the public, but 
Deloitte (and the others) have shown themselves unable to provide advance 
warning to the public of impending disasters which subsequently prove very 
costly. Major failures include:
· Deloitte Touche was responsible for delivering unqualified audits of 
major UK banks for the last set of accounts before they collapsed and 
were rescued at great public expense after the 2008 financial crisis, 
both in the UK (Royal Bank of Scotland, Alliance and Leicester, and 
Abbey National) and in the USA (Bear Stern, Fannie Mae) . 
• Deloitte acted as internal auditor at construction and services giant 
Carillion before it went into liquidation in January 2018. The final report 
of the Parliamentary inquiry into Carillion’s collapse criticised Deloitte 
for its involvement in the company’s financial reporting practices: 
“Deloitte were responsible for advising Carillion’s board on risk 
management and financial controls, failings in the business that proved 
terminal. Deloitte were either unable to identify effectively to the board 
the risks associated with their business practices, unwilling to do so, 
or too readily ignored them.” The select committee chairs (Frank Field 
and Rachel Reeves) called for a complete overhaul of Britain’s corporate 
governance regime, accusing the big four accounting firms of operating 
as a “cosy club”. Deloitte said it was “disappointed” with the committees’ 
conclusions regarding its role as internal auditors, but would take on 
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board any lessons that could be learned from Carillion’s collapse.
· Following Autonomy’s 2011 sale to Hewlett-Packard, the British software 
company was accused of accounting improprieties that contributed to 
an US $8.8 billion write-down of Autonomy’s value. In May 2018, the UK-
Based Financial Reporting Council launched disciplinary action against 
Deloitte, Autonomy’s auditor at the time of the sale. Deloitte Partners 
who led the audit were accused of failing to correct false and misleading 
information filed with the FRRP, and otherwise failing to act with 
objectivity during the course of the audit. The FRC’s action followed legal 
proceedings in the US that found former Autonomy executive Sushovan 
Hussain guilty of fraud earlier that month.
There are several other reports of cases where Deloitte have been 
incompetent or encouraged unethical behaviour by companies, including: 
· In September 2017, The Guardian reported that Deloitte suffered 
a cyberattack that breached the confidentiality of its clients and 
244,000 staff, allowing the attackers to access “usernames, passwords, 
IP addresses, architectural diagrams for businesses and health 
information”. Reportedly, Deloitte had stored the affected data in 
Microsoft’s Azure cloud hosting service, without two-step verification. 
The attackers were thought to possibly have had access from as early 
as October 2016.Brian Krebs reported that the breach affected all of 
Deloitte’s email and administrative user accounts.
· In 2011, Deloitte was commissioned by the tobacco industry to 
compile a report on illicit tobacco. The Australian Customs and Border 
Protection Service officials called the report “potentially misleading”, 
and raised concerns about the “reliability and accuracy” of the data. 
When a second Deloitte report focusing on counterfeit cigarettes was 
released, Home Affairs Minister Brendan O’Connor described the second 
report as “baseless and deceptive” and “bogus”. Public health officials 
criticised Deloitte’s decision to conduct the research, as it added 
credibility to the tobacco industry’s effort to undermine the Australian 
Government’s plain cigarette packaging legislation.
· Adelphia Communications: The Securities and Exchange Commission 
announced on 26 April 2005 that Deloitte had agreed to pay US $50 
million to settle charges relating to Adelphia’s 2000 financial statements. 
The settlement was later reported to be as high as $455 million.
· In November 2013, the international development charity ActionAid 
accused Deloitte of advising large businesses on how they could use 
Mauritius to avoid potentially hundreds of millions of dollars of tax in 
some of the poorest countries in Africa
· Dr Elisabeth Rosenthal attributed to Deloitte a key role in counselling 
the adoption of “strategic pricing” as a way of increasing revenues from 
hospital business.
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x. Serco
Serco is one of “world’s leading outsourcing companies”, employing over 
50,000 people and listed on the London Stock Exchange. In the UK, Serco 
operates in a number of sectors of public service provision, including health, 
transport, immigration and border control, defence and back-office services 
for local councils. Serco posted revenues of £2,836.8 million for the 2018 
financial year, and an underlying profit of £93.1 million. Its record is dotted 
with failures including the following: 
· Most recently, people were waiting up to two hours at their testing 
centres.
· Running a breast-cancer screening hotline services, where 450,000 
women did not receive invitations to screenings, leading Jeremy Hunt 
to estimate that 270 lives may have been cut short as a result. Women 
were being connected with call-handlers who had only had one hour’s 
worth of training.
· This same company was in the running “in pole position to win a deal to 
supply 15,000 call-handlers for the government’s tracking and tracing 
operation.”
• According to the NHS Support Federation: ‘For the NHS, Serco’s clinical 
contracts were associated with cost-cutting, fraud, poor management 
and inadequate staffing levels, which in at least one contract 
contributed to the deaths of two children.’
· Serco was forced to pull out of a contract to provide out-of-hours 
GP services in Cornwall after it emerged that the company had been 
falsifying data and that it had a ‘bullying culture’ which discouraged 
whistleblowing in the interests of patients.
· However, this was not the only contract cut short. Serco closed a 
community hospital three months before the end of their contract, 
because they said not enough patients were using the facility.
• With regards to prisons, one Serco prison in 2013 was among the three 
worst-performing jails in England and Wales, according to new Ministry 
of Justice ratings. One of Serco’s persons was criticised after a report 
showed that inmates had been left without electricity and running 
water for two days.
•  The company was previously fined £68 million after being accused 
of overcharging the government to monitor criminals who were dead 
or in jail. This was up from the £19.2 million originally estimated. The 
company had to repay another £2 million of ‘profits on a separate 
prisoner escort contract after it was found that its staff had been 
recording prisoners as delivered “ready for court” when they were not.
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xi. Edenred
Edenred, formerly known as Accor Services, is a French company which 
makes money from persuading governments to introduce luncheon voucher 
schemes which include tax relief.  
There have been recurrent problems of corruption with such schemes. For 
example, in Argentina “a representative of Accor Service approached the 
deputy sponsoring the proposal in November 2007 with offers of bribes of 
up to US $20 million if the deputy agreed to delay the proposal and change 
it so as to encourage, and even compel, more employers to purchase the 
vouchers. Recordings of telephone calls and meetings with the Accor 
representative were “used as evidence in a domestic legal case as well as 
the OECD Guidelines specific instance.”
